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"WHICH ONE OF YOU DID IT?" CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY FOR "CAUSING OR ALLOWING" THE 
DEATH OF A CHILD 
Lissa Griffin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, the statistics on child abuse and homicide are 
absolutely staggering. Homicide is the leading cause of death for children 
under one year of age, and at least five children die each day from abuse and 
neglect by those who are obligated to protect them.' Regrettably, although the 
homicides are attributable to the acts of persons who supposedly care for the 
children, it frequently is difficult to identify the culprits. 
Child homicide creates special problems for prosecutors. By its nature, 
child homicide occurs most frequently in the privacy of the home. In a case 
involving multiple defendants-for example, two parents or caretakers-proof 
frequently is unavailable to identify the person who actively caused physical 
harm to the child (the "active abuser") and the person who, although aware of 
the active abuse, failed to prevent it, or failed to get medical treatment for the 
injured child (the "passive abuser"). It frequently is difficult to determine the 
relative culpability of the responsible parties. Because there are no living 
witnesses, the prosecution cannot prove where or exactly how the crime took 
place, or who, aside from an active abuser, was present. While forensic 
evidence may prove that the death was non-accidental and the approximate time 
of death, such evidence still may be unable to clarify who committed the fatal 
act or acts, or who was present when they were committed. Given these 
circumstances, even though it is clear that someone caused the death of a 
helpless child, those who committed the acts may either not be charged, or if 
prosecuted, will likely be acquitted or have the charges dismissed. 
Neither U.S. courts nor the state legislatures have dealt with this problem. 
While much has been written about the omission-liability of a passive child 
abuser, all of the literature assumes that the prosecution has been able to in fact 
identify and differentiate the passive from the active a b ~ s e r . ~  No state court or 
Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author wishes to thank 
Professor Bennett L. Gershman and Professor Phil Bates for their invaluable assistance. The 
title of this article is based on the title of an article by Professor Glanville Williams. Professor 
Williams's article addresses the same problems of prosecuting child homicide addressed in this 
&cle, but in the context of the United Kingdom. "Causing or Allowing the Death of a Child or 
Vulnerable Adult" is the title of legislation recently passed by the English Parliament to address 
the same problems. 
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SWV., A NATION'S S W :  FATAL CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLJXT IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1995). 
2. See, e.g., Christine A. M a ,  Murder by ChildAbuse- Who's Responsible after State 
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legislature has proposed an effective method of overcoming the evidentiary 
insufficiency inherent in this most homble of crimes-the murder of an 
innocent child. 
In the absence of any effective domestic remedy, one needs to look to 
foreign law. Confronted with similarly horrifying statistics and similar 
prosecutorial problems, the English parliament3 recently enacted legislation to 
solve the problems inherent in prosecuting multiple defendants in a child 
homicide case. 
Part 11 of this article analyzes how current U.S. criminal law addresses the 
problem of securing a homicide conviction where multiple defendants are 
accused in a child's non-accidental death. Part ID sets forth the English 
response: a statute that includes (1) a new substantive crime; (2) a permissible 
negative inference against a defendant who fails to account for the non- 
accidental death of a child for whom he or she is responsible; and (3) delay of a 
motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case until after the 
defense has been presented or the jury has been allowed to draw the negative 
inference. The English response in light of U.S. law is analyzed, and its 
efficacy in meeting the prosecutor's evidentiary problems is evaluated. The 
article concludes that the English response should be adopted here, despite the 
controversial proposal that the jury in such a case be allowed to draw a negative 
inference against a defendant who bears responsibility for a child, who fails to 
account for that child's non-accidental death. 
A. Drficulties in Establishing Guilt 
Where a child suffers a non-accidental death, and more than one 
defendant is involved, there are two methods of establishing culpability. First, 
the culpability of both parties for homicide may be established under an 
accomplice liability theory. Second, where accomplice liability cannot be 
proven, one defendant may be prosecuted for the homicide as an active abuser, 
and the other may be prosecuted for either reckless homicide (generally, 
manslaughter), or under a protection or prevention statute, such as endangering 
the welfare of a child. However, in either scenario, the prosecutor must 
v. Jackson, 24 SEA- U.L. REV. 663 (2000); Nancy A. Tanck, Note, Commendable or 
Condemnable? Criminal Liability for Parents who Fail to Protect their Children from Abuse, 
1987 WIS. L. REV. 659 (1987); Ricki Rhein. Note. Assessing Criminal Liability for the Passive 
Parent: Why New York Should Hold the Passive Parent Criminally Liable, 9 CARDOZO 
WOMEN'S L.J. 627 (2003); Bryan A. Liang & Wendy L. Macfarlane, Murder by Omission: 
Child Abuse and the Passive Parent. 36 HARV. J .  ON LEGIS. 397 (1999); Jean Peters-Baker, 
Note, Punishing the Passive Parent; Ending a Cycle of Violence, 65 U .  Mo. KAN. C m  L. REV. 
1003 (1997). 
3. 'Zhis article makes reference to "England and "English" rather than to the United 
Kingdom because the legislation as enacted would apply to the courts in England and Wales, 
and not in the entire United Kingdom. 
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establish which of the defendants inflicted the fatal injury and which was aware 
that the injury occurred. 
These problems are illustrated in the case of People v.  on^.^ In Wong, 
a three-month old infant died of shaken baby syndrome.' The shaking had 
occurred in the apartment of the child's two babysitters, Eugene and Mary 
Wong, with whom the child resided six days a week. After a lengthy 
investigation, in which the Wongs gave incomplete and contradictory 
statements, the prosecution charged Mr. and Mrs. Wong with first and second 
degree manslaughter, and endangering the welfare of a child.6 
At trial, the prosecution's medical evidence proved that the fatal shaking 
of the child occurred in the one-bedroom apartment at some time during a two 
and one-half hour period at night, in which the defendants acknowledged to the 
police that they were both at home and caring for the child.' The infant slept in 
the defendants' bedroom. A medical expert testified that the shaking required 
to cause shaken baby syndrome does not necessarily leave visible exterior 
marks; that the infant would "cry sharply" and then, within 30 minutes, slip into 
a gradual coma that could resemble sleep.8 There was also medical evidence 
that "prompt medical attention can prevent fatality" in cases such as this one. 9 
At the close of the prosecution's case, the defense moved to dismiss the 
charges against both defendants. The defense argued that since the prosecution 
could not prove who was the active and who was the passive abuser, the 
defendants could not be found guilty.'0 In response, the prosecution argued 
that each defendant was culpable because, even though there was no proof of 
the defendants' respective roles, at least one of them had shaken the bab and 
the other had failed to intervene." The motion to dismiss was denied.' Y 
Both defendants were convicted of manslaughter in the first and second 
degrees, and endangering the welfare of a child.13 On appeal, the court 
modified the judgment by dismissing the convictions for manslaughter in the 
first degree on the unrelated ground that the finding that the defendants had 
acted or failed to act "with intent to cause serious physical injury" was against 
the weight of the evidence.14 The court upheld the convictions for 
4. 619 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1993). 
5. Id. at 380. Shaken baby syndrome occurs when an infant under the age of one year is 
shaken violently, causing the head to snap back and forth. Id. The movement of the brain 
inside the head leads to ruptured blood vessels, hemorrhage, and swelling, but does not 
necessarily result in any visible injuries. Id. 
6. N.Y. PENALLAW $8 125.15, 125.20,260.10 (Consol. 2004). 
7. Wong, 619 N.E.2d at 379. 
8. Id. at 380. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
1 1 .  Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. See N.Y. PENAL AW $ 125.20; see also People v. Wong, 588 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1992). 
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manslaughter in the second degree and for endangering the welfare of a child. 
Over a two-justice dissent, the court rejected the contention that the prosecution 
had failed to produce sufficient evidence of the time and place of death to show 
that the passive defendant failed to perform a duty imposed by law? 
The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which, 
where the court reversed the remaining convictions and dismissed the 
indictment against both defendants.I6 The court agreed with the defense that: 
(1) the evidence was insufficient to prove who was the active and who was the 
passive abuser; (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove the guilt of the 
passive defendant; and (3) without evidence that both defendants were guilty, 
the convictions of both defendants had to be reversed." 
According to the court, without proof of exactly when and where the 
death occurred, the passive defendant's mere presence in the apartment during 
the relevant time period was insufficient to establish criminal liability. The 
court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the passive defendant had a 
duty to seek medical care, because there was insufficient evidence that the 
passive parent knew of the need for such care. While both defendants admitted 
being awake and tending to the child during a two and one-half hour period 
when the shaking was likely to have occurred and although the apartment had 
only one bedroom, there was no proof that the two were continuously together. 
According to the court, it was certainly likely that one of them left the room at 
some point. Contrary to the State's contention that it would have been 
coincidence for the shaking to occur at that time, the Court considered it quite 
plausible that a person inclined to abuse a child would wait until he was alone 
with the child to do so.'* Thus, absent proof that the passive defendant was 
personally aware that the shaking had occurred, he could not be convicted. 
Without that evidence, the jury could not have concluded that the passive 
defendant was aware of a risk that the infant would die without prompt medical 
attention. Without that awareness, there was no liability for failing to act:I9 
In the absence of any evidence to show how, or at least where, 
the abusive acts had occurred and which room or rooms the 
two defendants had been in, there was no basis for the jury to 
infer that the 'passive' defendant had actually witnessed the 
shakingo- a form of abuse that would leave no visible external 
marks. 
15. Wong, 619 N.E.2d at 380. 
16. Id. at 383. 
17. Id. at 381-383. 
18. Id. at 382. 
19. Id. at 382-83. 
20. Id. at 382. 
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A theory that was not pursued by the prosecutors in Wong, which might 
have established that the passive abuser should have known or did know about 
the risk of serious physical injury, is based on the history of abuse of other 
children who had been left in the Wongs' care. In the lower court, the 
prosecution proceeded on the theory that the active defendant had shaken the 
child, and the passive defendant was personally aware of the shaking, and 
therefore of the risk that the infant would die without prompt medical treatment. 
In upholding the defendants' convictions, however, the Appellate Division 
suggested a different theory: "[Tlhat the 'passive' defendant was criminally 
culpable for knowingly permitting his or her spouse to tend to a crying child in 
a late-night situation that was likely to provoke abuse."21 
This theory is premised on the evidence admitted at trial to demonstrate 
that other children entrusted to the Wongs' care had also been abused.22 As the 
majority in the appellate division explained, evidence that there had been prior 
vicious acts of abuse, that both defendants had been interviewed by a social 
worker about those acts, and that the defendants participated in the decision to 
continue their babysitting service established both the knowledge of the passive 
defendant and a "blatant disregard for the welfare of the Moreover, 
both defendants made statements admitting that they were aware that the infant 
had been crying for two hours in the early morning before the fatal abuse 
occurred. "Under such circumstances, commonly known to be an exhausting, 
frustrating and emotionally wearing experience, to leave the child at the mercy 
of a known child abuser would be, without more, a conscious disregard of a 
substantial risk of death . . . . ,924 
As the court of appeals noted, however, this theory was not submitted to 
the jury. The evidence of prior incidents of abuse was admitted only to rebut a 
defense of accident or mistake.25 Had the theory been properly raised, the 
21. Idat  383. 
22. Wong, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 122. As summarized by the Appellate Division, that evidence 
is as follows: 
In March 1988, 18-month-old Kevin Hung, when taken by his father to the 
hospital after spending a month with the Wongs, was found to have a second 
degree bum on the sole of his foot, bruises on his face and body, and fractures, 
one recent and one several weeks old, in each leg. As a result, he was 
hospitalized for 13 days. Earlier, on a visit, Kevin's father had observed a bum 
on the child's mouth, but had dismissed it as an accident when Mrs. Wong told 
him that Kevin had tried to taste some hot soup which she had left out to cool. In 
June of 1988, shortly before Kwok-Wei Jiang came into the Wongs' care, 1112- 
month-old Jenny Chan was taken to the hospital by her father when he visited her 
at the Wongs' and saw that her face was badly discolored and that she was 
completely unresponsive. Mrs. Wong claimed that she had found the baby in 
that condition when she awoke and suggested that it was due to an "internal 
problem." Jenny was hospitalized for three days. 
Id. 
23. Id. at 125. 
24. Id. at 125-26. 
25. Wong, 619 N.E.2d at 383. 
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defendants might have been convicted on the grounds that one of them was the 
principal and one the accomplice. 
Reluctantly, the Court of Appeals reversed both convictions: 
We are duty bound to reverse these two defendants' 
convictions because the alternative - incarcerating both 
individuals for a crime of which only one is demonstrably 
culpable - is an unacceptable option in a system that is based 
on personal accountability and presumes each accused to be 
innocent until proven otherwise.26 
What becomes clear from Wong is that none of the weapons in the 
prosecutor's traditional arsenal was adequate to avoid this result. First, there 
were no eyewitnesses. Second, the forensic investigation and resulting 
evidence, although complete, were not sufficient. Evidence regarding cause of 
death and time of death could not establish the defendants' culpability without 
proof of where each of the defendants was when the death occurred. Moreover, 
absent visible bruises or signs of distress, there was insufficient proof that the 
passive defendant actually witnessed the shaking or was otherwise aware that 
anything fatal had occurred or that anything needed to be done to help the child. 
Without such proof, there was no mens rea to establish liability based on the 
failure to act. 
Of course, the prosecutor could have ted immunity to one of the 5Y defendants, and thus secured an eyewitness. But in the context of child 
homicide, with the absence of important information, the prosecutor's choice of 
which party to immunize is particularly vulnerable to error. The role of the 
respective parties in causing the child's death is exactly what the prosecutor 
does not know. Even if the prosecutor guesses correctly, a guilty party could go 
free2* But if the prosecutor guesses wrongly, the active, more culpable abuser 
goes free. Unlike other situations requiring a decision to grant immunity, in 
this case the prosecutor has a full fifty percent chance of being wrong. On the 
other hand, it may be that both parties are equally responsible, for example, on 
an aiding and abetting theory. Thus, although it is clear that someone is 
responsible for the child's death, the power to grant immunity may not help at 
all, or may be surrounded by so much guess work that there is an increased and 
unacceptable risk that a child's murderer will be freed.29 
26. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
27. See N.Y. CFUM. PROC. LAW 5 50.10 (Consol. 2004) (providing full transactional 
immunity in New York). 
28. The passive abuser, for example a mother, may have violated a duty to prevent 
commission of an assault upon her child or for failing to secure medical attention. 
29. See N.Y. PENALLAW 55 500.05,500.10 (Consol. 2004); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 383- 
b(5) (Consol. 2004). Even if the prosecutor guesses correctly, immunity may not solve the 
problem. The immunized spouse still would have a privilege against testifying against his or her 
spouse. In New York, where only confidential communications remain privileged, the 
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B. Accomplice Liability 
Where two or more defendants are present and responsible for the care of 
a child at the time the child sustains non-accidental fatal injuries, both 
defendants may be found guilty of intentional or reckless homicide under a 
theory of accomplice liability, even if the prosecution cannot prove who was the 
active abuser and who was the passive abuser. In such a case there is sufficient 
evidence for the jury to infer that both parties either intended the fatal result, or 
because they were both present, were aware of the injury and of the risk of 
death and assisted in bringing it about. In a case like Wong, however, where 
the prosecution cannot prove exactly when the fatal abuse occurred or who was 
present, accomplice liability cannot be sustained. While it is clear in such a 
case that someone committed murder or manslau hter, unless both defendants 
can be proven guilty, neither can be convicted. 38 
Accomplice liability may also be sustained under so-called 
"accountability"  statute^.^' Under these statutes, the failure to prevent child 
abuse will render the passive participant criminally liable as an accomplice for 
the active abuser's crime, whether for homicide or assault. 
Three cases illustrate the application of accomplice liability principles. 
First, in Lane v. ~ommonwealth?~ a mother and her companion were 
prosecuted together under an accountability theory for assaulting her two-year- 
old daughter. Their defense was that the injuries resulted from an accidental 
fall down stairs. Lane was charged with aiding and abetting her companion to 
commit assault. The medical evidence showed that the victim had sustained 
many bruises, abrasions, and contusions, including a skull fracture. Lane was 
found guilty of complicity to commit assault in the first degree and her 
companion was found guilty of the assault. However, the trial judge set aside 
~ a n e ' s  conviction on the ground that Lane had no legal duty to prevent the 
assault. 33 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky a f f i e d  the court of appeals' reversal 
of the trial court's ruling. The court of appeals held that parents have a legal 
duty to provide safety to their children. The majority found support in recently 
immunized spouse might be compelled to testify against the other one. See N.Y. PENAL LAW $5 
500.05,500.10; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW 3 393-b(5) (2004); People v. Allman, 342 N.Y.S.2d 896 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (holding that because social services law suspends confidential 
communications privilege between husband and wife in proceedings involving child abuse, a 
wife may testify that she saw her husband hit their child and that he would not let her telephone 
for assistance); accord Adams v. State, 563 S.W.2d 804,809 (Tern. Crim. App. 1978) (holding 
that a wife may testify to husband's fatal assault on child as exception to privileged marital 
communication). But what would be the result? Still, a potentially guilty party would go free. 
30. See, People v. Wong, 619 N.E.2d 377,383 (N.Y. 1993). 
3 1. See, e.g., State v. Fabritz, 348 A.2d 275 (Md. 1975) (relying on MD. ANN. CODE ART. 
27 35(a) (1982), current version at MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW art. 27,s 35(b) (Supp. 1986)); 
see also State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986) (relying on WIS. STAT. 940.201 
(1985-1986)). 
32. 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997). 
33. Id. at 875. 
Heinonline - -  15 Ind. Int'l & Cornp. L. Rev. 95 2004-2005 
[Vol. 15: 1 
enacted statutes designed to protect a child's fundamental right to safety.34 The 
concurring justice found the duty in the common law, based upon the special 
relationship between a dependant child and his or her parents.35 In either event, 
the court found that the requirement of an actus reus was satisfied by the 
mother's failure to fulfill that duty. Moreover, the requisite accomplice mens 
rea was based on the defendant's knowledge or awareness of risk. The court 
held that a person who knows that his or her child is in a dangerous situation 
and fails to take action to protect the child presumabl intends the 
16 
consequences of the inaction, which is to facilitate the offense. 
Similarly, in Palmer v. the Supreme Court of Maryland upheld 
the conviction of a mother for involuntary manslaughter based on her "gross, or 
criminal, negligence in permitting her paramour to inflict, upon her twenty 
months' old child, prolonged and brutal beatings that finally resulted in the 
,938 child's death . . . . The court premised the mother's duty primarily on 
Maryland's nurturing statute, which requires parents to supply "support, care, 
nurture, welfare and education" to their children.39 
Finally, in State v. ~ a l d e n , ~ '  a mother was convicted of aiding and 
abetting an assault solely on the ground that she was present when her child 
was assaulted but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the assault. The 
court recognized a parental duty to take affirmative action to prevent harm to a 
~ h i l d . ~ '  
These authorities would not support culpability in cases such as Wong. In 
these three cases, the prosecution was able to prove who was the active abuser 
34. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 620.020 (Michie 2004) (providing for a fundamental right 
to be free from personal injury); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 405.020 (Michie 2003) (duty to 
"nurture", which court held does not permit tolerance of personal injury); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
5 508.100 (Michie 2004) (Criminal abuse in the first degree is committed when a person who 
has custody of a child intentionally permits the child to be placed in a situation that may cause 
him or her serious physical injury.). 
35. Lane, 956 S.W.2d at 876-77 (Cooper, J., concurring). 
36. Id. at 876; see also State v. Miranda, 715 A.2d 680 (Conn. 1998) (imposing 
accomplice liability for permitting a child to be assaulted). 
37. 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960). 
38. Id. at 468. 
39. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. Art. 72 A, 5 1 (1957 code), current version at 
5 5-203 (2003)). 
40. 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982). 
41. Id. at 786. 
We believe that to require a parent as a matter of law to take affirmative action to 
prevent harm to his or her child or be held criminally liable imposes a reasonable 
duty upon the parent. Further, we believe this duty is and has always been 
inherent in the duty of parents to provide for the safety and welfare of their 
children, which duty has long been recognized by the common law and by 
statute. 
Id. at 785-86; see also Michael v. State, 767 P.2d 193 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other 
grounds, Michael v. State, 805 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1991); P.S. v. State, 565 So.2d 1209 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1990); People v. Peters, 586 N.E.2d 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Peabody, 
119 Cal. Rptr. 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Adams, 557 P.2d 586 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976). 
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of the child and who was the passive abuser. In Wong, that proof was missing 
In these three cases, the prosecution was able to prove that the passive 
defendant knew about the abuse or was aware of the risk of abuse, either 
because he or she witnessed the abuse or because of the visibility of the 
victim's injuries. In Wong, again, there was no such evidence. 42 
C. Protection and Prevention Statutes 
Many jurisdictions recognize a separate non-homicide crime based on a 
common-law parental duty to prevent the abuse of a child, punishable with 
criminal penalties. Again, this duty is based on the special personal 
relationship between parents and children, and the fact that the parent has 
undertaken to provide safety to the child. Generically, that duty is violated 
when the defendant is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of death or injury. At that point, criminal penalties may be 
imposed under so called "failure to protect," "endangering the welfare," or 
"contributing to the dependency" statutes.43 In these jurisdictions, the passive 
parent is held criminally culpable not for the active abuser's conduct, but rather 
for his or her own conduct in, for example, permitting a child to be exposed to 
great bodily injury,44 neglecting a child, failing to provide medical 
exposing a child to abuse,46 or failing to report abuse of his or her 
These crimes generally are classified as misdemeanors, and carry lesser 
sentences than the homicide statutes, even where the underlying conduct causes 
a child's death.48 For this reason alone, they may be considered as an 
42. 619 N.E.2d 377,382-83 (N.Y. 1993). 
43. See, e.g., ALA. STAT. $ 26-15-1 (Michie 1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 13-3619 
(West 1978); 13-3623B; CAL. PENALCODE $ 273(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. 5 609.378(2)(b)(l-2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. 55 9:6-1 (West 1987), 
2C:24-4(a) (West 1995). 
44. See, e.g., State v. Peters, 780 P.2d 602,606 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989); State v. Walden, 
293 S.E.2d 780,787 (N.C. 1982). 
45. See, e.g., People v. Sally, 544 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681-82 (1989) (noting that by not 
securing medical treatment for a child while the child was being abused by his stepfather, 
resulting in injuries so severe that the defendant was aware that the child required medical 
attention, the defendant was guilty of violating the common law duty to protect). 
46. See, e.g., N.Y. PENALLAW $ 260.10[2] (Consol. 2004). "A parent, guardian or other 
person legally charged with the care or custody of a child less than eighteen years old" is guilty 
if he or she "fails or refuses to exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such a child to 
prevent [the child] from becoming an 'abused child,' a 'neglected child,' a 'juvenile delinquent' 
. . . ." Id. One of the purposes of this statute is to establish "the duty of one parent to protect 
the child from the other parent." Id. See also People v. Carroll, 715 N.E.2d 500, 501 (N.Y. 
1999) (quoting William C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries, in 39 MCKINNEY'S CONSOL. 
LAWS OF N.Y. 348). 
47. Seattle v. Eun Yong Shin, 748 P.2d 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). 
48. See, e.g., N.Y. PENALLAW 5 260.10 (stating that endangering the welfare of achild is 
a misdemeanor, which carries a maximum sentence of one year incarceration); ARE. REV. STAT. 
ANN. $ 13-3619 (West 2004) (providing a class 2 misdemeanor for permitting life, health or 
morals of minor to be imperiled by neglect, abuse or immoral associations). But see, e.g., ARK. 
Heinonline - -  15 Ind. Int'l & Cornp. L. Rev. 97 2004-2005 
98 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 15: 1 
inadequate substitute where one of the defendants has clearly caused the death 
of a child. 
For example, in People v. ~ a r r o l l , 4 ~  the New York Court of Appeals 
upheld a conviction for endangering the welfare of a child where the defendant, 
the stepmother of a child who was beaten to death by the father, failed to alert 
the authorities or summon medical assistance. The beatings occurred over the 
course of several days, and the defendant witnessed most of the violence. The 
court held that the evidence established that the defendant was acting as "the 
functional equivalent" of the child's parent at the relevant time, and had an 
obligation to take action to protect or help the 
In Wong, the proof would still have been inadequate to establish the 
defendants' liability under these statutes. Again, as with the accomplice 
liability cases, the active and passive abuser are each clearly identified, and 
there is proof, based on the timing, manner, and extent of the injuries inflicted, 
that the passive abuser had or should have had knowledge of the active abuser's 
conduct. In Wong, of course, this was the precise evidentiary gap. There was 
no evidence distinguishing the roles of the two defendants, no evidence of 
precisely when the fatal abuse was committed, and no evidence of who was 
present at the time. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence that the 
passive defendant was aware of the risk of death, or that emergency medical 
assistance was required.5' 
III. THE ENGLISH RESPONSE 
A. The Wong Problem in England: Regina v. Lane 
In England, as in the United States, existing law provides that if the 
evidence shows that one of two accused must have committed a crime, but the 
prosecution cannot prove which of them committed it, both must be acquitted.52 
This is true in cases of child abuse resulting in death, where two defendants are 
responsible for the care of a child. In Regina v. L ~ n e ? ~  the court of appeal held 
that both defendants were required to be acquitted under these  circumstance^.^^ 
CODE ANN. 9 5-27-221 (a)(3) (Michie 2004) (permitting that abuse of a minor is a class B felony 
if the abuse consists of sexual intercourse, deviate sexual activity, or caused serious physical 
injury or death; otherwise, it is a class D felony). 
49. 715 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1999). 
50. Id. at 502. 
51. Peoplev. Wong,619~.~. '2d377,383 (N.Y. 1993). 
52. Regina v. Lane, 82 Cnm. App. R. 5 (1986); Regina v. Bellman, 86 Crim. App. R. 40 
(1988). 
53. 82 Crim. App. R. 5 (1986). 
54. Id. See also Aston and Mason 94 Crim. App R. 180 (1992), quoted in LAW COMM'N, 
CHILDREN: THEIR NON-ACCIDENTAL DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY 282 (2003) [hereinafter 
Commission Report]. 
We have felt forced to come to the unwelcome conclusion that there was nothing 
in the evidence at the close of the prosecution case which indicated that one of 
the appellants rather than the other was responsible for inflicting the fatal injuries 
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The facts in Lane are very similar to those in Wong, and create the same 
prosecutorial problems. There, a mother and stepfather were jointly responsible 
for the care of their child, who sustained a fractured skull sometime between 
noon and 8:30 p.m. Each parent had been absent from the home at times and 
present at times during this period. Both denied responsibility for the injuries. 
The judge rejected the English equivalent of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to establish a prima facie case. The prosecution argued, and the court 
instructed the jurors, that they could draw an inference that both defendants 
were culpable because they both bore responsibility for the child. Neither 
defendant testified, and both were c o n v i ~ t e d . ~ ~  The court of appeals held that 
in the absence of evidence showing: (1) both defendants were present when the 
child was fatally injured; or (2) the non-striking parent was actively involved in 
the harm to the child, the jury should not have been invited to draw an 
inference that, in the absence of an innocent explanation, the parents were 
jointly responsible. 
B. Curing the Wong Problem in England 
Confronted with similar frightful  statistic^,'^ and the same prosecutorial 
handicaps, the English government appointed a commission to study the issue. 
A comprehensive Law Commission Consultative Report on the subject, 
"Children: Their Non-Accidental Death or Serious Injury," followed.57 
Thereafter, legislation was passed creating a new crime called, "Causing or 
Allowing the Death of a Child or Vulnerable ~du l t . " '~  The same statute should 
be adopted in the United States. 
. . . . Nor can we find any evidence upon which the jury might have concluded 
that the two of them were acting in concert. 
Id. 
55. Lane, 82 Crim. App. R. at 5-1 1. 
56. Commission Report, supra note 54, at 15-18. 
57. Id. 
58. Domestic Violence, Crime and Victim's Act, 2004, c. 28, $0 5-7. The English statute 
reads as follows: 
(1) A person ("D") is guilty of an offence if- 
(a) a child or vulnerable adult ("V") dies as a result of the unlawful act of a 
person who- 
(i) was a member of the same household as V, and 
(ii) had frequent contact with him, 
(b) D was such a person at the time of that act, 
(c) at that time there was a significant risk of serious physical harm being 
caused to V by the unlawful act of such a person, and 
(d) either D was the person whose act caused V's death or-- 
(i) D was, or ought to have been, aware of the risk mentioned in 
paragraph (c), 
(ii) D failed to take such steps as he could reasonably have been expected 
to take to protect V from the risk, and 
(iii) the act occurred in circumstances of the kind that D foresaw or ought to 
have foreseen. 
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A. A New Substantive Offense 
The English statute creates a new crime that applies where: (1) a child 
dies as a result of unlawful conduct; (2) a member of the child's household 
caused the death, (3) the death occurred in anticipated circumstances; and (4) 
the defendant was or should have been aware of the risk, but either caused the 
death or did not take reasonable steps to prevent it. The prosecution does not 
need to show which member or members of the household actively caused the 
death and which passively failed to prevent it. This crime is categorized as a 
homicide offense. 
Evidentiary and procedural changes also accompany the new law. 
Specifically, the jury may draw a negative inference against any defendant who 
fails to account for the manner of fatal injury either to the police or at trial. The 
decision on the motion to dismiss is then delayed until the close of all the 
evidence to allow either the defendants' statements, or the negative inferences 
against them, to be counted as part of the evidence in determining whether the 
prosecution has established a prima facie case. Once that proof is included, the 
motion to dismiss is rarely granted. 
The new statute contains all of the elements that must be established 
before the state may punish conduct: actus reus, mens rea, and causation. The 
statute would also make it possible to establish liability for homicide by two or 
more persons responsible for a child when that child dies. The possibility of 
acquittal, dismissal, or conviction of a mere misdemeanor in such a 
circumstance could be avoided in many cases. 
Two issues arise concerning the actus reus, whether there is a duty to act 
and what evidence may be offered in defense of that duty. 
a. Duty to Act 
The statute recognizes a duty to provide a safe environment for a child. 
This includes not physically harming the child, as well as not failing to prevent 
harm of which a person responsible for the child was or should have been 
aware. The class of persons to whom the statute would apply would be 
narrower than that within the traditional universe of adults, who under the 
common law doctrine have a special relationship status that canies with it a 
duty to provide a safe environment for a Under the statute, only those 
the close of all the evidence (or, if at some earlier time he ceases to be charged 
with the section 5 offence, before that earlier time). . . . 
Id. 5 6. 
59. See Statute, supra note 58. 
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responsible adults who live in the victim's household are included. This would 
include the Wongs, in whose household the child lived for six days out of every 
week. It would also include a parent or step-parent who lives with the child, 
and the paramour or companion of a residential parent, assuming that person 
had frequent contact with the child. On the other hand, unlike traditional 
common law omission cases, the existence of a special status relationship 
would not be enough on its own to establish culpability under this statute. For 
example, a father or mother who did not reside and have frequent contact with 
the child at the time of the non-accidental injury could not be found guilty, 
despite the parental relationship, even if that parent was aware of a risk of 
serious injury. 
Like existing protection and prevention statutes, this statute would also 
exclude public employees such as social workers or childcare workers. Under 
the new statute, these categories of outsiders will not be liable, since they are 
not members of the victim's household. The same will be true for doctors or 
nurses who come into contact with the child, however frequently. Moreover, 
the requirement that the defendant have "frequent contact" with the victim 
would prevent the liability of occasional visitors, paramours, guests, or those 
who happen to be present at the scene.60 This requirement, combined with the 
requirement that the death occur in anticipated circumstances, would also 
preclude a parent's liability for conduct by a stranger or transient visitor, of 
which he or she had no notice. Thus, the inattentive parent whose child is 
kidnapped from a playground and killed would not be held criminally 
responsible for the death. 
b. Defense to Failure to Act 
Under the statute, it would be a defense that the defendant "could not 
reasonably have been expected to take" steps to protect the child, because, for 
example, to do so would have subjected him or her to serious physical injury. 
A defendant should be convicted under this statute only where the prosecution 
proves that any reasonable person in the defendant's position would have taken 
action. Indeed, "in the commonplace situations in which offences are 
committed against children it will be a matter of obvious common sense to 
identify what it was reasonable to expect the responsible person to do."6' 
This provision has two collateral benefits. First, it permits a battered 
spouse, generally a mother, to interpose a defense to the crime that does not 
exist in all U.S. juri~dictions.~~ That is, the battered woman would be 
60. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 506 S.E.2d. 374 (Ga. 1998) (holding that defendant could 
not be found liable for fatal abuse of a child where he spent the night downstairs at his sister's 
while sister and boyfriend killed child upstairs). Id. 
61. Commission Report, supra note 54, at 55. 
62. For a complete discussion of existing failure-to-protect legislation and how it fails to 
consider the battered spouse's circumstances, see V. Pualani Enos, Recent Development: 
Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused 
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permitted to prove her own abuse in her defense, and then argue that a 
reasonable person in her circumstances could not have taken action to prevent 
the death. A full-blown duress defense would not be required.63 Second, the 
existence of this defense might also encourage the passive abuser to give her 
account of how the child died. This might in turn result in more exposure and 
even prosecutions of batterers. Third, proof of other violence would be 
available for the jury to consider on any accompanying count of murder or 
manslaughter that the defendant and any co-defendant also faced.64 
2. Mens Rea: Intent or Awareness of Risk 
The mens rea requirement for liability under the statute is satisfied by 
proof that the defendant either (1) intentionally harmed the child or (2) had 
notice of a high level of risk of serious physical harm to the child. The "intent" 
standard is the traditional intent required for general criminal culpability.65 The 
standard covers the active abuser and the accomplice to active abuse. 
The awareness-of-risk standard is applicable to the passive abuser. It 
contains both an objective and subjective element, and would cover two 
categories of defendants: (I)  a person in the defendant's circumstances who is 
aware of or ought to be aware of the risk of serious physical harm being caused 
by an unlawful act by someone (i.e., the responsible adult who is careful 
enough to be aware of the risk but does not act reasonably to prevent the result), 
and (2) the responsible adult who is not aware because he or she is culpably 
ina t ten t i~e .~~ The test is not whether a "reasonable person" would be aware of 
the risk of death to the child. Instead, the test is whether a reasonable person in 
the defendant's situation would be aware of a significant risk of serious 
physical harm.67 
As noted above, an additional mens rea requirement is that the offense be 
committed in the kind of circumstances the person anticipated or should have 
Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229 (1996) (arguing, inter alia, that the failure to employ a 
"reasonableness" standard in favor of strict liability for the passive parent is improper). 
63. Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers 
Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J. C m .  L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579,587 (1998); see also 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorn, JR., CRIMINALLAW 208-09 (2d ed. 1986). Courts have 
not yet identified what acts would be considered to put parents in sufficient danger to excuse 
their failure to protect a child, probably because such evidence generally would result in an 
acquittal. 
64. Commission Report, supra note 54, at 96. 
65. Generically, a person intends a result when it is his or her conscious purpose to bring 
it about. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 3 14 (7th ed. 2000). 
66. Commission Report, supra note 54, at 53. 
67. This is consistent with protection and prevention statutes that consider the culpability 
of a battered or abused spouse. See, e.g., State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986) 
(providing an objective standard for determining what constitutes child abuse and doing away 
with the requirement of other mens rea); State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 787 (N.C. 1982) 
("The failure of a parent who is present to take all steps reasonably possible to protect the 
parent's child from attack by another person constitutes an act of omission by the parent 
showing the parent's consent and contribution to the crime being committed."). 
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anticipated, and by a person who lives with and who has frequent contact with 
the child. It is not sufficient that there be awareness of a risk that a child might 
be the victim of some intervening offense, or some offense by someone who 
does not live with the child. For example, there would be no liability for a 
grieving parent whose child is kidnapped while playing out of the parent's 
sight, even if the parent had been culpably inattentive. Nor would there be 
liability for a parent who allows a child to be alone with an abusive parent, 
where the child is harmed by another individual during that time. The risk is of 
anticipated, deliberately inflicted harm as a result of an illegal act. 
This statute would support the culpability of both parties regardless of 
whether the prosecution can establish who is the active and who is the passive 
abuser, so long as the injury to the child was visible to both parties. Thus, in 
Lane, where the infant suffered physical injuries, the defendants could now be 
held liable even without proof of their respective roles, because whoever was 
the passive abuser would or should have been aware of the risk of serious 
physical injury. In addition, awareness of a risk of serious physical injury could 
be established by proof of a pattern of continuing abuse or of prior serious 
abuse, of which the passive defendant would have been aware. 
It is not clear, however, that the proof in Wong could have satisfied this 
statute. Wong was not a case, like Lane, in which the visible nature of the 
child's injuries would reasonably have been noticed by someone in the 
defendants' circumstances. Indeed, Wong presents the almost unique 
circumstance in which the prosecution lacked proof not only of when the baby 
was fatally harmed, but also of who was present when the harm occurred. In 
Wong, the prosecution also could not prove that anyone not present at the 
moment of abuse would have been aware of the injury or of the need to act, 
because, uniquely, the injury left no external bruises. Indeed, the Court of 
Appeals specifically noted that the symptoms of shaken baby syndrome-a 
gradual fall into a comatose state with no external injuries4ould easily be 
mistaken for the quieting down of the child.68 
3. Causation 
To establish culpability under the statute, proof of causation must, of 
course, be present. Generally, this should not be difficult for the prosecution to 
prove. There will almost always be medical testimony that the child died of 
non-accidental causes. Under the statute, this proof would be sufficient to 
support the liability of both defendants. Thus, in Palmer v. the court 
a r m e d  a mother's involuntary manslaughter conviction for negligently 
68. See People v. Wong, 619 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1993). For cases like Wong, the 
evidentiary and procedural changes suggested in the statute-a negative inference based on a 
duty to account for the non-accidental death of a child, and the accompanying delay of the 
motion to dismiss to permit that account or the inference from its absence-would be required. 
69. 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960). 
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permitting her child to be abused even though she was not the active abuser. 
The court reasoned that "to constitute the cause of the harm, it is not necessary 
that [the mother's] act be the sole reason for the realization of the harm which 
has been sustained by the [~hild.]"'~ By keeping the child in proximity to the 
harm, the court reasoned that the mother indirectly contributed to the abuse. 
Where liability is premised on a failure to promptly secure medical treatment or 
care, the proof that frequently exists in prosecutions now-that earlier medical 
attention would have averted the death-would also be sufficient to establish 
that the conduct of the passive defendant was a proximate cause of death. 
In conclusion, in those cases where it is not possible to establish 
traditional intent or accomplice liability, the statute would provide an 
alternative homicide statute under which to secure a conviction. In addition, 
where it is not possible to identify which of two or more defendants was the 
active or passive abuser, the statute permits a finding of criminal culpability for 
both, so long as there is evidence to establish sufficient awareness of risk on 
behalf of both defendants, either because of the defendant's presence at the 
time of the abuse, the visible nature of the injuries sustained, or a past history of 
abuse. In the unique circumstance where the prosecution cannot prove when 
the abuse occurred or who was present, and where the abuse leaves no visible 
signs, the new statute will probably not be successful absent adoption of the 
proposed procedural and evidentiary changes that are discussed below. 
B. Drawing a Negative Inference From the Failure to Account for the 
Non-Accidental Death of a Child 
I .  English Law 
The English statute provides that the court and jury be allowed to draw a 
negative inference against any defendants who fail to give a statement before or 
at trial concerning how the child's death occurred. Although this may appear 
shocking to the U.S. reader, the law in England has allowed such an inference 
to be drawn in all criminal cases for at least a decade. 
Unlike in the United States, in England the right to remain silent is not 
absolute. Pursuant to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 5 35(3) 
("CJPOA), a jury may draw "such inferences as appear proper" against a 
defendant who: ( I )  remains silent or fails to answer a question during 
questioning by the police after being properly cautioned; (2) remains silent at 
trial; or (3) proves facts at trial inconsistent with those given in response to 
earlier police questioning. 7 1 
- - - - - - -- - -- 
70. Id. at 474 (quoting 1 CHARLES E. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 68 (2d 
ed. 1976). 
71. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, $34 (Eng.). The English statute 
provides, in substance, that where a defendant gives evidence and relies on a fact he or she 
failed to mention to the police, or if a defendant does not give evidence or gives evidence but 
unreasonably refuses to answer a question, the court or jury may again draw such inference as 
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Under the statute, when a defendant is charged with murder or 
manslaughter and the new criminal offense, the jury may draw a negative 
inference against the defendant as to all charges when that defendant either fails 
to account for the homicide to the police, fails to give an account at trial, or 
gives an account at both times but those accounts are inconsistent. 
The legality of the CJPOA inference under the European Code of Human 
Rights, and the ways in which it has been implicated, q e  beyond the scope of 
this article.72 It is sufficient to note that the proposed statute would allow the 
drawing of the inference against a silent defendant both as to the crime of 
causing or allowing the death of a child, and as to any accompanying charge of 
homicide. 
2. The Negative Inference under U.S. Law 
a. Drawing a Negative Inference Based on a Duty to Report 
In cases like Wong, prosecuted under the new statute, where the 
prosecution can prove the non-accidental death of a child, can narrow down the 
group of responsible parties, but cannot prove the defendants' relative guilt, the 
duty to provide a safe environment for a child should be construed to include 
the duty to account for that child's non-accidental death. The failure to so 
account could then permit a negative inference against the non-reportin 
defendant. This was a solution proposed by the Commission in England; 8 
however, this solution does not appear in the final statute submitted to the 
Queen. Instead, Parliament simply relied on the existing statutory inference 
from silence and proposed a delay in the motion to dismiss so that this 
inference could form part of the prosecution's prima facie case. 
Statutes creating a duty to report child abuse already exist in every state 
of the United States, and extend the duty to doctors, nurses, and others who are 
likely to be in a position to report child abuse. Under these statutes, a person 
appear proper. Id. As to facts that the defendant did mention on being questioned and could 
reasonably have been expected to mention, the court or jury may draw such inferences from the 
failure as appear proper. Id. Section 38(3) prohibits a conviction based solely on such an 
inference. Id. $38(3). These sections have been upheld by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR).. See, e.g., Condron v. United Kingdom 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2001); Murray v. 
United Kingdom 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (1996). 
72. The ECHR has held that the limitations on the right to silence are consistent with the 
European Code of Human Rights. Commission Report, supra note 54, at 40-43. It was the 
Commission's position, as well, that Article 6 would not be violated because of: (1) the 
fundamental importance of the duty owed to the child under Articles 2 and 3; (2) the 
unsatisfactory state of the current law; (3) the safeguards described before a jury may draw a 
negative inference; and (4) the fact that the jury must be sure of the defendant's guilt before 
convicting. Id. Finally, the Commission recommended that a trial judge be under a duty to 
withdraw the case form the jury when he considers that any conviction would be unsafe or the 
trial would otherwise be unfair. The Commission explicitly noted that this safeguard might be 
particularly important if an adverse inference from silence was likely to be an important factor in 
the jury's considerations. Id. 
73. Id. at 35-36. 
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can be prosecuted for failing to report suspected abuse.74 These statutes reflect 
a unanimous recognition that child abuse is a problem of staggerin dimension, 
and that children can be better protected by encouraging reporting!' Indeed, in 
some jurisdictions, a parent's failure to account for abuse of a child is 
considered proof that the family situation is unlikely to chan e for the better, 
!6 
and is thus part of the basis for terminating parental rights. Moreover, as 
previously discussed in Part II, some states hold parents criminally liable for 
failing to prevent abuse (by reporting or otherwise), either under an aiding and 
abettin theory for homicide or assault, or under a protection and prevention 
5 7  
statute. Thus, the duty to report already exists in some form. 
As part of the new statute, a presumption should be created that would 
pennit the jury to draw a negative inference against one of multiple defendants 
charged under the statute where that defendant has failed to account for the 
non-accidental death of a child. The inference would be based on the 
responsible defendant's duty to account consistent with that defendant's Fifth 
Amendment privilege. Thus, the failure to account for the non-accidental death 
would be sufficient to provide an inference that the reason for the failure is that 
the account would be self-incriminatory. 
California v. ~ ~ e r s ~ ~  is the Supreme Court's major statement on the 
constitutionality of duty-to-report statutes. Byers was a plurality opinion 
written by Chief Justice Burger, where the Court analyzed a California statute 
requiring any driver involved in a vehicular accident that resulted in property 
damage to stop at the scene and leave his or her name and address. Although 
the so-called "st0 and identify" statute was potentially self-incriminatory, the 
Court upheld it. 7 8  
The Court began its analysis by noting that it was "balancing the public 
need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on 
74. See Caroline Trost, Note: Chilling Child Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the CAPTA 
Amendments, 5 1 VAND. L. REV. 183 n.63 (1 998). 
75. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN.. 8 37-1-402(a) (1996). 
The purpose of this part is to protect children whose physical or mental health 
and welfare are adversely affected by brutality, abuse or neglect by requiring 
reporting of suspected cases by any person having cause to believe that such case 
exists. It is intended that, as a result of such reports, the protective services of the 
state shall be brought to bear on the situation to prevent further abuses, to 
safeguard and enhance the welfare of children, and to preserve family life. This 
part shall be administered and interpreted to provide the greatest possible 
protection as promptly as possible for children. 
Id. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. $8 9:6-8.8 (West 1993) (providing "for the protection of 
children . . . who have had serious injury inflicted upon them by other than accidental means"). 
76. See, e.g., West Virginia Dep't. of Health and Human Res. ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 
475 S.E.2d 865 (W. Va. 1996); Adoption of Larry, 750 N.E.2d 475 (Mass. 2001). 
77. See discussion supra Part 11. 
78. 402 U.S. 424 (1971). 
79. Id. at 432. 
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the other," and that "neither interest can be treated lightly."80 Reviewing other 
duty-to-report requirements, the Court noted: 
In each of these situations there is some possibility of 
prosecution-ften a very real one-for criminal offenses 
disclosed by or deriving from the information that the law 
compels a person to supply. Information revealed by these 
reports could well be "a link in the chain" of evidence leading 
to prosecution and conviction. But under our holdings the 
mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the 
strong policies in favor of a disclosure called for by statutes 
like the one challenged here." 
Reviewing its precedent, the Court explained that the question is not the 
possibility of incrimination, but whether the duty to report presents a 
"substantial hazard of self-incriminati~n."~~ That determination in turn 
depends on the answers to the following questions: (1) is the statute aimed at 
the public at large or at a "highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal 
activitie~;"~~ (2) is the statutory purpose "essentially regulatory" or is it aimed 
at facilitating the criminal conviction of the reporter; and (3) is the statute 
designed to disclose inherently illegal activity of the reporter?84 
In Byers, the Court concluded that the statute was aimed at a sufficiently 
large portion of society (drivers involved in accidents) that it could not be 
deemed to address a "highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal 
activities." The fact that it was aimed at accident participants, many of whom, 
like Byers, might be guilty of criminal conduct, did not change the fact that 
driving, and even being involved in an accident, does not necessarily involve 
criminal conduct.85 As to the second criterion, the Court noted that despite the 
collateral criminal consequences of disclosing one's name and address, and the 
possibility that this increased the likelihood of prosecution, the statute's main 
purpose was essentially to regulate motor vehicle use. The duty to report-that 
property damage has occurred-indicated that the duty's purpose was proper1 
to impose responsibility for economic compensation for any property damage. & 
80. Id. at 427. 
8 1. Id. at 428. 
82. Id. at 429 (quoting U.S. v. Sullivan. 274 U.S. 259 (1927)). 
83. Id. (quoting Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70,79 (1965)). 
84. Id. at 430. 
85. Id. at 431. Compare Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79 (holding that an order requiring 
registration by members of communist organizations violates the Fifth Amendment); Haynes v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (holding that an order requiring registration of firearm 
involved inherently criminal activity and therefore violated the Fifth Amendment). 
86. The Court explained: 
Although identity, when made known, may lead to inquiry that in turn leads to 
arrest and charge, those developments depend on different factors and 
independent evidence. Here the compelled disclosure of identity could have led 
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Similarly, although the statute might provide a link in the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute for criminal conduct that may have occurred, the Court 
held that the driver's self-reporting would not be the sole evidence against a 
driver in any criminal case. In short, the Court concluded: 
The disclosure of inherently illegal activity is inherently risky. 
Our decisions in Albertson and the cases following illustrate 
that truism. But disclosure with respect to automobile 
accidents simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk of 
self-incrimination involved in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes. 
Furthermore, the statutory purpose is noncriminal and self- 
reporting is indispensable to its fulfillment.87 
The Court applied its analysis in Byers in a case where the safety of a child was 
at issue. Again, the Court upheld the duty to report. 
In Baltimore City Dep 't of Social Servs. v. ~ o u k n i ~ h t , 8 ~  in a seven-judge 
majority decision authored by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that a parent's 
duty to produce a child in response to a court order trumps the parent's right 
against self-incrimination, even in a case where the authorities suspect that the 
child has been murdered by the parent.89 In Bouknight, a mother who had 
custody of her child pursuant to a court order refused to comply with another 
court order to produce her child. The authorities believed the child had been 
abused and had died as a result. The Maryland Court of Appeals struck the 
lower court's order holding the mother in contempt on grounds that the act of 
production forced Bouknight to admit "a measure of continuing control and 
dominion over Maurice's person in circumstances in which 'Bouknight has a 
,,,90 reasonable apprehension that she will be prosecuted. Accordingly, the court 
found the contempt order uncon~titutional.~' 
Again, as in Byers, despite the obvious self-incriminatory implications of 
the duty to produce a child under the circumstances presented, the Supreme 
Court reversed and held that Bouknight could not invoke her Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination to resist the order to produce her The 
to a charge that might not have been made had the driver fled the scene; but this 
is true only in the same sense that a taxpayer can be charged on the basis of the 
contents of a tax return or failure to file an income tax form. There is no 
constitutional right to refuse to file an income tax return or to flee the scene of an 
accident in order to avoid the possibility of legal involvement. 
Byers, 402 U.S. at 434. 
87. Id. at 43 1. Interestingly, Byers was indeed later charged with the substantive criminal 
offense of overtaking another vehicle. Id. at 424. 
88. 493 U.S. 549 (1990). 
89. For the purposes of the decision, the Court assumed that the act of production was 
testimonial in nature. Id. at 555. 
90. Id. at 554 (quoting In re Maurice M, 550 A.2d 1135, 1141 (Md. 1988)). 
91. Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 554. 
92. Id. at 562. 
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Court used the same three-part test it used in Byers to determine if the duty 
violated the Fifth Amendment. 
Fist, the Court found that persons who care for children pursuant to 
custody orders are not members of "a selective group inherently suspect of 
criminal activities" even though the may have been found by the court to be 
J 3  
unable to give proper care to a child. Second, it found that the statute did not 
"focu[s] almost exclusively on conduct which is ~riminal. ' '~~ Even though the 
mother was suspected of criminal activity, the Court explained: 
Even when criminal conduct may exist, the court may properly 
request production and return of the child, and enforce that 
request through exercise of the contempt power, for reasons 
related entirely to the child's well-being and through measures 
unrelated to criminal law enforcement or investigation. 95 
Finally, the Court observed that it was "not called upon to define the 
precise limitations that may exist upon the State's ability to use the testimonial 
aspects of Bouknight's act of production in subsequent criminal 
proceedings."96 It did note, however, that using immunity "is not appropriate 
where a significant element of the regulatory requirement is to aid law 
enforcement ."97 
Using the Byers and Bouknight criteria, imposing a duty on an individual 
to account for the non-accidental death of a child for whom he or she is 
responsible should survive Fifth Amendment scrutiny. First, the duty to 
account is directed toward parents, or those standing in responsible positions to 
children. This is not a "highly select group inherently suspect of criminal 
activity."98 While it could be argued that the statute is really aimed at those 
caretakers whose children have been abused, the same argument was made in 
Byers and Bouknight - that the statute was aimed at criminal activity (drivers 
who caused accidents or caretakers who abused their children) and thus at 
people who were likely to be found to have engaged in criminal conduct. That 
argument was rejected because the Court found no necessary correlation 
between causing an accident and criminal conduct99 or between having court 
ordered child custody because of deficient parenting and criminal conduct. loo 
Similarly, the fact that one reports that one's child has been killed does not 
necessarily mean that the reporter has himself or herself engaged in criminal 
93. Id. at 559-60 (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,57 (1968) (quoting 
Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70,79)). 
94. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424,454 (1971) (Harlan, J., concuning). 
95. Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 562. 
98. Byers, 402 U.S. at 429. 
99. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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conduct. Indeed, it is more likely that the act of reporting will be proof that the 
caretaker has not engaged in any crime either as an accomplice or for failure to 
protect. In addition, in many states, these individuals already have a civil duty 
to account for harm to a child. 
Second, the proposed duty to account could be sustained as having a 
regulatory purpose besides facilitating the reporter's criminal conviction. 
Indeed, the proposed duty to account would be no more than an extension of 
the existing statutory duties to report that apply to third parties. The purpose of 
the duty is to protect children from harm at the hands of their caregivers by both 
encouraging reporting and accurately identifying the abusers. Third, the 
proposed duty is not impermissibly designed to "disclose the illegal acts of the 
reporter."'0' In fact, the duty is aimed at exposing the culpability of the active 
abuser who causes the child's death. 
Finally, under U.S. law, the safeguards accompanying the drawing of the 
inference in the criminal context may be sufficient to minimize the impact on 
the Fifth Amendment right, thus protecting the right against self-incrimination. 
To be sure, the defendant must be advised of the permissible inference when 
questioned by the authorities; this would be added to the standard Miranda 
warnings where the non-accidental death of a child is suspected. 
b. The Supreme Court's No-Inference Precedent 
Having established a duty to account for the non-accidental death of a 
child, the jury should be allowed to draw a negative inference against a non- 
reporting defendant during a prosecution under the new statute. The inference 
is supported by the following factors: (1) the importance of protecting children 
from murder at the hands of those who are supposed to care for them; (2) the 
fact that the inference rests on a substantive, common-law duty to provide 
safety; (3) the limited circumstance under which the inference would be 
available, that is, only where the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of two or 
more responsible parties for the death of a child for whom they were 
responsible. Under these circumstances, the drawing of the inference should be 
sustained under the Fifth Amendment. 
The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "No person . . . shall be 
compelled in an criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." In Grifin 
102' 
v. California, the Supreme Court held that neither a court nor a prosecutor 
may comment on a defendant's silence. Under Grifin, no negative inference 
whatsoever may be drawn from the defendant's silence because such an 
inference would chill the defendant's exercise of that right by making its 
exercise costly. 103 
101. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
102. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
103. Id. at 615. 
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The Supreme Court has adhered to this conclusion. Sixteen years after 
Grifin, in Carter v. Kentucky, the Court reaffirmed that a defendant has a right 
to have an instruction given to the jury that the ury may not draw any 
inferences from the defendant's failure to testify.'' Moreover, in the 1999 
case of Mitchell v. United ~ t a t e s , ' ~ ~  the Court, by a five-to-four majority, 
extended the no-comment rule to sentencing proceedings, refusing to allow a 
judge to rely on a defendant's failure to contest certain factual assertions that 
served to increase her sentence. The majority eloquently (and quite relevantly 
to a comparative analysis) defended the no-adverse-inference rule as follows: 
The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for 
teaching that the question in a criminal case is not whether the 
defendant committed the acts of which he is accused. The 
question is whether the Government has carried its burden to 
prove its allegations while respecting the defendant's 
individual rights. The Government retains the burden of 
proving facts relevant to the crime at the sentencing phase and 
cannot enlist the defendant in this process at the expense of 
the self-incrimination privi1ege.lo6 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has chosen to stick to its no-adverse- 
inference rule. Indeed, as the quote from Mitchell implies, one difference 
between the United States and other countries (including England) is that the 
United States remains a resolutely rights-based, accusatoeal system.lo7 Before 
the recent domestic adoption of the ECHR, England was not a rights-based 
system by any means. Although England recognized many rights of accused 
persons similar to the United States, it has no written constitution or bill of 
rights. Moreover, as a monarchy, English judicial process has remained more 
inquisitorial than the U.S. system, with more emphasis on the obligations of its 
citizens as subjects than in the United States. The U.S. system is still built 
upon protecting against conviction of the innocent and limiting the authority of 
the sovereign rather than viewing its citizens as subjects. 
Nevertheless, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, a defendant charged 
with the new crime of causing or allowing the death of a child should have a 
substantive duty to account for the death of the child. Where it is clear that 
someone has caused the non-accidental death of a child, and where the 
prosecution cannot otherwise prove its case (such as in the circumstances of 
Wong and lane), the Court should uphold a negative inference against the non- 
reporting defendant. Like juries in England, a U.S. jury would be instructed 
that it could consider the non-reporting defendant's failure to account for the 
104. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), remanded to 620 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1981). 
105. 526 U.S. 314 (1999). 
106. Id. at 330. 
107. Id. 
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child's death. If the jury believes the failure to account is based on the fact that 
the defendant is responsible for the death under the new statute, then the jury 
could draw the negative inference. The jury could also consider the 
defendant's explanation for his or her failure to account in evaluating whether 
to draw a negative inference. As in England, the jury would also be instructed 
that it could not base a verdict of guilty on the inference alone. And, as in 
England, the court would retain the power to vacate a conviction if it concluded 
that the inference played too large a role in the jury's verdict. 
c. Delaying the Decision on the Motion to Dismiss 
Finally, what of the statutory provision delaying the decision on whether 
there is a case to answer until the close of all of the evidence? Like the U.S. 
motion to dismiss at the end of the prosecution's case, in England there is a 
procedural rule that requires a judge to dismiss a case at the close of the 
prosecution's case where a properly directed jury could not convict (there is 
"no case to answer").lo8 According to the Commission, it is the operation of 
this rule that prevents the prosecution from properly convicting those 
responsible for child abuse, because under traditional principles the evidence is 
insufficient at the close of the prosecution's case to establish the defendant's 
relative culpability. As the Commission noted, the requirement that this 
decision be made after the close of the prosecution's case makes no logical 
sense in a child abuse case, where the only witness (because the child is dead or 
too young to speak) is the defendant, who by that time will not have been heard 
from. Thus, the Commission recommended that the decision whether to send 
the case to the jury be made only after the defendant's case. That is, the often 
taken-for-granted procedure should be changed to abolish the decision on 
whether there is a case to answer, and to substitute the decision whether the 
case should go to the jury, which decision would properly be made at the end of 
all of the evidence. 
Delay of the motion to dismiss would likely survive constitutional 
scrutiny in the United States. To be sure, a defendant is entitled to a 
determination that the prosecution has established a prima facie case in which 
the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury.'@ While it is preferable for the 
motion to be made at the end of the prosecution's case, so that the defendant 
knows whether he should attempt to rebut the prosecution's case, the 
determination of sufficiency can be reserved until after the j verdict and can 
U T l O  be made until seven days after the jury has been discharged. Thus, under 
U.S. law, there would be no constitutional barrier to delaying the motion to 
dismiss until after the close of all of the evidence. 
108. Galbraith [I9811 1 W.L.R. 1039. 
109. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c). 
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This article supports the enactment in the United States of a statute 
similar to England's new statute. Like its English counterpart, this statute 
would impose the same criminal responsibility on each member of a small, 
definable group of members of a deceased child's household for the child's 
non-accidental death and would not require proof as to which person was the 
active or passive abuser. The new offense would be classified as a homicide 
offense. It would establish culpability for homicide, but the sentence would be 
less than that for other homicides. At the very least, then, the statute would 
impose a sentence that is greater than that currently available under 
Endangering the Welfare of a Child statutes, which are misdemeanors in most 
jurisdictions even where the defendant's conduct causes death."' At the same 
time, this new statute would prevent acquittal in those jurisdictions that do not 
recognize omission liability for failure to prevent abuse or to seek medical 
assistance. 
In other cases, however, the key to successful prosecution is the drawing 
of a negative inference from the failure to account and the delay of the motion 
to dismiss. Under established Supreme Court precedent, the U.S. courts could 
recognize an evidentiary inference against a defendant who fails to account for 
the death of a child for whom he or she is responsible under the proposed 
statute that would be permissible in a case in which the defendants are charged 
under the statute. A proper balance of the state's interest in and need for the 
inference and the limited incursion on the Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent would prevent the acquittal of all parties where it is clear that one or both 
of them are responsible for murdering a helpless child. 
11 1 .  See, e.g., N.Y. PENALLAW 5 260.10 (stating that endangering the welfare of a child is 
an A misdemeanor); People v. Carroll, 715 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1999). 
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